Max B Gold wrote: ↑Mon Feb 21, 2022 1:06 pm
Chillax man. Did I say drop everything and do it? No I flipin' well didn't.... I therefore expect a full reply by 4.30pm.
I've just scanned through it. He's basically recommending Minsk 2. I had already commented on that, but put it on the Tory Watch thread instead:
Dunners wrote: ↑Fri Feb 11, 2022 10:56 am
Macron let things slip earlier in the week with his Finlandization comment.
Peace,
for now, can probably be secured by acceptance of the Minsk 2 agreement. That means the federalisation of Ukraine with Russian proxies being able to veto any foreign policy they disagree with. The US is happy for that as it means they no longer have the Ruskies distracting them from their Indo-pacific concerns. Germany and France are also happy with that as it means they don't have to deal with a European security crisis at a time when they're ill-prepared.
It's just that Ukraine may feel differently. The President, should he accept Minsk 2, would effectively be ending Ukraine's sovereignty. And, even if he felt that this was the least-worst option available to him, it's not clear how or even if he can implement it. There's a good chance he'll end up swinging from a lamppost should he try, especially now that they been training thousands of armed Ukrainians in the civilian defence force.
It seems that Russia has foreseen this situation, and is calculating that Minsk 2 is just not probable, even if everyone agrees to it. Russia then has to factor in some other calculations, especially its dire demographic trends. In just eight years it's estimated that the Russian population will have aged to such a degree that it will only be able to muster 50% of a military force compared to now. For the Russians, if military action is to be an option, it's now or never.
I remain unconvinced that Minsk 2 is a permanent solution, and I'm also sceptical of the practicalities of it being implemented now. It may just be that its moment has passed. I really hope I'm wrong, as I too cannot see any other diplomatic option that will avoid a catastrophic war.
Chomsky will be pleased to know that I agree with his assessment of post-Soviet evolution of NATO and US foreign "zombie" policy. George H.W. Bush, to his credit, did try and make this debate part of his platform for re-election in 1992, but the US voters weren't in the mood so voted Clinton in instead. And under Clinton things just went nuts, such as pushing for Hungary to join at a time when it didn't even share a border with another NATO member.
Since that 1992 election, the US electorate has become increasingly disinterested in foreign policy to the extent that in the last two elections there was not a single candidate advocating for a serious discussion about it. It took Trump, of all people, to call it for what it is, and frame it in economic terms. A lack of democratic sunlight has played a part in allowing policy to evolve in ways it
may otherwise not have, including R2P, the broadening definitions of NATOs "area of jurisdiction" and even the organisation's justification for existence.
But, seen through Chomsky's eyes, the eastward expansion of NATO is presented as problematic. However, those states that did join post 1992 hardly did so under duress. Offered the option they jumped at the chance, as was their sovereign right to do so. And they've told us repeatedly why; it's because they perceive Russia as the bigger threat. And, if you're in the NATO club, it's been a good deal. Countries have been able to invest more into other things as a result of relatively reduced defence budgets. The Germans are arguably the biggest beneficiaries of the economic advantages of being a NATO member, and they bloody lost the last war.
I understand that from Russia's perspective things may not seem so rosy. But, as I've said before, NATO unity is only really a threat if it stops you from projecting your power instead. Maybe if Russia had focused on projecting soft power instead, it may have found that its neighbouring states were less scared and therefore less inclined to join NATO in the first place.
Instead, I like to imagine what Europe would be like without NATO. Would it be a better or worse place than today? Is the life experienced by all of us better or worse because of NATO's existence? Obviously it's impossible for any of us to know for sure, but we can take a good guess by looking at history. And that suggests that the past 70-ish years have been the best time to be a European.
So, for all its many flaws, and in an imperfect world, I'm satisfied that we're part of NATO. But I'm no fan of it. What I'm a fan of is any global order that can best ensure the health and prosperity of as many people as possible. As soon as a better and practicable idea comes along then NATO can do one.
